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QUESTIONING THE PER SE STANDARD




Four CEOs of rival companies hold a secret meeting in which they
decry the crushing and ruinous competition between them, the ever-falling
profit margins, and the seemingly endless cycle of price-cutting. The
solution? The four covertly agree to increase prices by 10 percent right
away and by a further 10 percent a week later. Sure enough, prices rise,
profitability is up, and the CEOs are happy-until the antitrust enforcement
agencies discover the deal. Under the competition laws, the four CEOs
have committed a per se violation of the Sherman Act' and are likely to
face considerable penalties! Such factors as desperation in the face of
dwindling profits and increased competition fall on deaf ears, for the
CEOs' joint act of fixing prices is illegal in and of itself.3 This should be far
from surprising, for the principle that concerted monopoly power over price
is illegal constitutes the most fundamental tenet of antitrust law.4
* Alan Devlin, BBLS (Int'l) National University of Ireland, Dublin; LL.M, J.S.D., University of
Chicago Law School, 2006; JD candidate, Stanford Law School, 2007.
1. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000 & Supp. 2004). See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S.
392, 398 (1927) (holding that minimum, horizontal price-fixing is illegal per se); Arizona v. Maricopa
County Med. Soc'y, 457 U.S. 332, 348 (1982) (holding that even maximum, as opposed to minimum,
horizontal price-fixing is subject to the per se ban).
2. See Clayton Antitrust Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (2000) (granting injured parties right to sue for
treble damages).
3. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-21 (1940).
4. See, e.g., Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 223 (1993)
(referring to "the antitrust laws' traditional concern for consumer welfare and price competition");
Reiter v. Sonotone Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 343 (1979) (holding that the Sherman Act creates a "consumer
welfare prescription"); ROBERT BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 427 (Free Press 2006) (1978)
(arguing that the sole purpose of the antitrust laws is to promote consumer welfare); William J.
Kolasky, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, U.S. and EU Competition
Policy: Cartels, Mergers, and Beyond (January 25, 2002) (transcript available at
http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9848.pdf) (noting that "the ultimate goal of any sound
competition policy must be consumer welfare, which competition advances through lower prices,
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A more interesting question concerns the proper status of concerted
monopsony power. Monopsony is the converse of monopoly-it involves
buyer, as opposed to seller, clout. Hence, consider the opposite situation of
that presented above. Imagine now that the four CEOs clandestinely meet
in desperation following ever-rising input costs. The components they buy
from their suppliers have become so expensive that the CEOs see their
costs of production skyrocketing, the prices they charge their customers
increasing, and their profits dwindling. Accordingly, they agree to refuse to
purchase their inputs at current prices and instead will agree to purchase
them only if the price charged is reduced by 20 percent. The manufacturers
of these inputs have no other use for their produce and are forced to reduce
their price. After the agreement, the four companies find their total costs of
production sharply reduced and their profitability back up. Are the CEOs
and the companies they represent guilty of a per se breach of the antitrust
laws? Is concerted monopsonistic power over input-prices necessarily
illegal?
The answer is not immediately apparent, either as a matter of law or
theory. The courts are currently split on the question of whether per se
illegality should attach to concerted instances of monopsonistic price-
setting.' On the theoretical level, unilateral or concerted distortion of
market outcomes by firms is invariably understood to be harmful to
allocative and productive efficiency.6 Ultimately, antitrust law focuses on
consumer welfare as the sole consideration in assessing the competitive
significance of business acts. Consumer injury typically flows from
artificially produced market distortions and, so, practices that cause such
distortions are struck down.
Yet, in the context of monopsonistic control, harm to consumers is not
immediately evident. Instead of prices going up, they are forced down. At
an intuitive level, one might imagine that such cost-reductions will
necessarily be passed onto consumers and, on that basis, should be
presumptively deemed legal. Interestingly, however, economics can show
that such cost-reductions will rarely be passed onto consumers.
higher output and enhanced innovation"); Howard H. Chang et al., Has the Consumer Harm Standard
Lost its Teeth? 1 (Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Sloan School of Management Working Paper
No. 4263-02, 2002) ("[C]onsumer welfare is the fundamental standard for evaluating competitive
effects."), http://ssm.com/abstract-id=332021. See generally Robert H. Lande, Consumer Choice as the
Ultimate Goal ofAntitrust, 62 U. PITT. L. REV. 503 (2001).
5. Compare Balmoral Cinema, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 885 F.2d 313, 317 (6th Cir.
1989), Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274, 280-81 (D. Mass. 1995), and
Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 908 F. Supp. 1194, 1203 (W.D.N.Y.
1995), with Telecor Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1133-34 (10th Cir. 2002),
United Airlines, Inc. v. U.S. Bank N.A., 406 F.3d 918, 925 (7th Cir. 2005), and Khan v. State Oil Co.,
93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997).
6. See, e.g., DENNIS W. CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, MODERN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION
634-37 (4th ed. 2005) (discussing the goals of antitrust law).
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Nevertheless, can it be accurately said that firms' monopsonistic reduction
in input costs is invariably objectionable and will never enhance consumer
welfare in downstream markets?
This Article explores the application of the per se standard to
instances of concerted monopsony power in oligopsonistic contexts. A
minority of jurisdictions to consider the phenomenon has held that market
power on the selling side in downstream markets is a prerequisite to
antitrust liability. This minority position has been discredited by the
majority of courts and academics to consider the issue. These
commentators and judges have forcefully argued, and held, that per se
illegality should attach.
Yet, it will be shown below that faithful adherence to the underlying
principles of both the per se standard and the consumer welfare imperative
suggest that the minority approach may be the technically correct one.
Importantly, though, this observation does not render the minority approach
laudable, for the monopsony context suggests that dogmatic adherence to a
strict notion of consumer welfare may be improper. Accordingly, this
Article seeks to address the question of how "anticompetitive" ought to be
defined.
II. DETERMINING THE SCOPE OF PER SE ILLEGALITY
In Part II.B, infra, it will be shown that concerted monopsony power is
capable of being anticompetitive and harmful. Accordingly, circumstances
clearly exist in which such concerted conduct should be deemed illegal.
The question that this Article seeks to address, however, is whether such
condemnation is always appropriate. The legal standard used to label such
categorical denunciation is that of per se illegality. In order to determine
whether concerted monopsony power over input-prices ought to be
subjected to this legal standard, then, it is necessary to consider the
circumstances in which the standard is applied.
A. THE PER SE STANDARD
Under the antitrust laws, business practices construed as inherently
and inescapably anticompetitive are struck down under a per se standard of
illegality. The Supreme Court has identified such practices as those with
pernicious effect and little or no redeeming virtue.' Alternatively, per se
illegality is justified where a business practice's "nature and necessary
7. An oligopsony is a market structure characterized by concentration on the purchasing side of the
market with a relatively large number of sellers. This generally arises in input market where a limited
number of manufacturers compete to acquire factors of production. JEFFREY M. PERLOFF,
MICROECONOMICS 521 (2d ed. 2001).
8. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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effect are so plainly anticompetitive that no elaborate study of the industry
is needed to establish their illegality."9 In general, then, "[p]er se rules of
illegality relate to conduct that is manifestly anticompetitive."'"
Importantly, however, the Supreme Court has expressed its reluctance to
employ the per se standard where the economic result of the practice is not
immediately obvious."
The practices identified as being worthy of such treatment are limited
in number and clear in effect. The benefit of a per se standard involves
efficiency-if a majority of practices will be harmful, it saves on costs to
declare all such practices illegal even if some manifestations of the
phenomena at issue may be benign or enhancive of consumer welfare.
Nevertheless, the costs thereby saved must be weighed against the harm of
declaring a benign practice illegal."
Accordingly, a critical determination in identifying those practices
worthy of per se condemnation involves the likelihood of Type I and II
errors. A Type I error arises when a proper null hypothesis is erroneously
rejected.' 3 As applied to the current context, per se illegality will give rise
to Type I errors when procompetitive business practices are struck down. A
Type II error occurs where an improper null hypothesis is mistakenly
accepted.14 Type II errors will not arise under a per se standard, for every
anticompetitive manifestation of the practice at issue will be held illegal.
As classically expressed by Judge Easterbrook, anticompetitive
practices erroneously permitted will be eroded-by the mechanisms of the
free market; procompetitive activities mistakenly outlawed have their
benefit lost forever.' In short, the label of per se illegality must be applied
sparingly and only where the business practices in question are
"pernicious" and lack any "redeeming virtue"; 6 that is, where the
possibility of Type I error is slight. The crucial question, then, is whether
instances of concerted monopsonistic power possess some redeeming
virtue and, if so, whether the extent of those benefits should preclude
application of the per se standard.
B. DEFINING "ANTICOMPETITIVE"
The first step in assessing whether monopsonistic conduct is purely
9. Nat'l Soc'y of Profl Engineers v. United States, 435 U.S. 679, 692 (1978).
10. Cont'l T.V. v. GTE Sylvania, 433 U.S. 36, 49-50 (1977).
11. See, e.g., State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3, 10 (1997).
12. See, e.g., Cont7 T., 433 U.S., at 50 n.16.
13. For an example of a Type I error analysis being applied to legal reasoning, see Ballew v.
Georgia, 435 U.S. 223, 234 (1978).
14. For an example of a Type II error analysis being applied to legal reasoning, see id.
15. Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15 (1984).
16. See, e.g., N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1958).
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pernicious, or carries some form of concomitant benefit, is to identify a
normative standard. Without one, defining "anticompetitive" becomes a
futile task.
Although antitrust law has been continuously evolving since the
enactment of the Sherman Act 7 in 1893, consumer welfare has emerged as
the fundamental standard informing competition policy." According to
this norm, only where a concerted or unilateral activity reduces output and
raises price in a relevant market, thereby harming consumers, should the
activity be struck down. Thus, per se illegality is appropriate only where
consumer welfare will invariably be diminished.
Interestingly, though, the modem focus on consumer welfare as the
sole standard by which to judge claims of anticompetitive behavior does
not sit easily with the jurisprudence of the Supreme Court. Time and again,
the Court has referred to the process of competition that must be
protected. 9 While consumer harm is universally cited as being worthy of
condemnation, it is rarely the lone consideration." Although the Court's
modern proclamation that antitrust law does not protect individual
competitors greatly supports a consumer-focused competition regime,2' it
does not remove from consideration other factors that may be viewed as
relevant. Foremost among these must surely be a demonstrable restriction
in market output of the type witnessed when sellers collude to depress the
market-clearing price.
Fortunately, the Supreme Court's focus on protecting the process of
competition is almost always reconcilable with the maximization of
consumer welfare. Accordingly, and given the considerable reverence
granted the consumer norm by the enforcement agencies and courts today,
the Chicago School's focus on consumer welfare has become the de facto
standard.
A valid question, then, is to ask what kind of harms should be
cognizable as injurious to consumers. Today, the Chicago22 and post-
Chicago23 Schools of antitrust jurisprudence have influenced the courts and
enforcement agencies to the degree that now only elevated prices and
diminished output in consumption markets are typically objectionable.24
17. Act of July 2, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (2000)).
18. See supra text accompanying note 4.
19. See infra text accompanying note 79.
20. See infra text accompanying note 79.
21. See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 344 (1962) ("It is competition, not
competitors, which the Act protects.").
22. See generally Richard A. Posner, The Chicago School of Antitrust Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REV.
925 (1979).
23. See generally Herbert Hovenkamp, Post-Chicago Antitrust: A Review and Critique, 2001
COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 257 (2001).
24. See, e.g., Kolasky, supra note 4.
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This consumer-centric philosophy manifests itself not only in the
substantive rules governing business practices, but also in the standing
prerequisite for bringing suit. According to this rule, a plaintiff must have
suffered an "injury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent
and that flows from that which makes the defendants' acts unlawful. 25
More specifically, harm to the competitive process, rather than harm to
individual competitors, must be demonstrated for a plaintiff to have
standing. The raison d'8tre of this requirement is the consumer welfare
imperative. As explained by the Supreme Court, "Low prices benefit
consumers regardless of how those prices are set, and so long as they are
above predatory levels, they do not threaten competition. Hence, they
cannot give rise to antitrust injury.,
26
Armed with the consumer welfare standard of harm, it is easy to see
why the concerted exercise of monopoly power meets the per se standard.
A cartelized industry's higher prices do more than increase the sellers'
profitability-they harm society. By raising the price of a good beyond the
marginal cost of production-the price that would exist under perfect
competition-some consumers who value the good at a level equal to, or
greater than, the cost to society of producing it are nevertheless denied
access to it. As a result, there is a loss in value as some consumers satisfy
their demand by switching to goods that require more of society's scarce
resources to produce. 2' As expressed in economic terms, sellers typically
face downward-sloping demand curves so that their concerted action to
increase the purchase price results in a restriction in output. This creates
what economists refer to as deadweight loss.
28
Accordingly, concerted monopoly power is typically pernicious. As
there are few, if any, instances in which the concerted exercise of
monopoly price power is apt to increase consumer welfare,29 there is no
significant redeeming virtue. Thus, monopoly price-fixing is properly
condemned under the per se standard.
So, what of concerted monopsony power? As the mirror image of
concerted monopoly power, one would automatically assume that similar
per se treatment should follow. Indeed, this is the path taken by the
majority of courts to consider the question." Nevertheless, the ensuing
economic analysis will demonstrate how the effects of monopsony and
25. Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
26. Atl. Richfield Co. v. U.S. Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328, 340 (1990).
27. See RICHARD POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 278 (Aspen 6th ed. 2003) (1972).
28. See CARLTON & JEFFREY M. PERLOFF, supra note 6, at 95-96.
29. But see RICHARD POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 20 (2d ed. 2001) (discussing the possibility that
monopoly may spur greater levels of innovation than competition).
30. See, e.g., Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996) ("[M]onopsony pricing...
is analytically the same as monopoly or cartel pricing and so treated by the law.") (Posner, J.), vacated,
522 U.S. 3 (1997).
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monopoly are readily distinguishable and that the role of the consumer
must be approached in a distinct manner. Specifically, the consumer
welfare-reducing effect of monopsony power is unquestionably more
attenuated than is the case with seller-side cartels. This constitutes the
source of the tension involved in applying the consumer welfare standard in
this context, for distortion of market outcomes is immediately apparent,
though a showing of elevated prices is somewhat more elusive.
This Article proceeds by economically assessing the phenomenon of
monopsony power in order to determine the circumstances in which
consumers may, and may not, be harmed, in addition to identifying societal
harms of a type arguably not encapsulated by a strict interpretation of the
consumer welfare standard. Armed with the foregoing knowledge, it will
be possible to consider the case law that has considered the question of
concerted control over price in the oligopsonistic context. The counter-
intuitive nature of consumer harm potentially flowing from reduced input
costs will be seen to have led some courts astray. Meanwhile, other courts
have struggled to reconcile the possible absence of consumer harm in some
instances with the market distortion in every monopsony case. Ultimately,
this will lead to a suggested rule for courts seeking to advance the
consumer welfare standard only, in addition to a proposal for the widening
of that standard to incorporate the type of ancillary harms with which
antitrust should arguably be concerned.
III. THE ECONOMICS OF MONOPSONY
From the consumer welfare perspective, the position that the
economic consequences of monopsony are equivalent to those of monopoly
is too facile. Unlike in the case of monopoly, there are two markets with
which one ought to be concerned. In the input market, the exercise of
monopsony power indisputably reduces the cost of the input. Where the
input elasticity of supply is less than completely inelastic, moreover, some
reduction in the quantity of the input purchased will also take place.
However, unlike with monopoly, there is a second, downstream market that
must be considered. It is here that the question of the competitive
significance of monopsony power will be answered, for this is where
consumer welfare issues are triggered.
A. THE WORKINGS OF MONOPSONY POWER
A monopsonist--or a group of firms acting in concert to achieve the
same position-possesses power over the price at which the purchased
good clears. While a purchaser in a competitive market would be a price-
taker, the monopsonist chooses the price-quantity pair on the market supply
curve where the marginal value of the input equals the marginal cost of
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
consuming the unit.3' More technically, the monopsonist will purchase at
the point where its marginal factor cost 2 meets its demand curve.33 As the
marginal outlay schedule-the monopsonist's equivalent to a marginal
revenue curve-lies above the supply curve, the monopsonist purchases
less than would a competitive buyer.34 Accordingly, there is typically an
output restriction in much the same way as in the monopoly context. Of
course, the extent of the ensuing reduction depends on the price elasticity
of supply.
Were output restriction in and of itself a ground for prohibition on
antitrust grounds, the concerted exercise of monopsony power in an input
market should be per se illegal. The question shall be asked infra as to
whether such distortions in market outcomes ought to be condemned
without further inquiry into the effect on downstream prices. Applying a
literal consumer welfare requirement, however, the restriction in output
must be linked to a consumer welfare loss in the form of higher prices. It is
to this connection that we now turn.
B. MONOPSONY POWER GENERALLY HARMS CONSUMERS
Where firms collectively exercise monopsony power over input price
upstream, and individually possess significant market power downstream,35
it is likely that consumer harm will take place. This insight proves
confusing for many.
It is misleading to assert that downstream sellers' reduced input costs
will necessarily result in lower prices downstream and, hence, elevated
levels of consumer welfare.36 R. Hewitt Pate, speaking on behalf of the
U.S. Department of Justice Antitrust Division, recently explained:
A casual observer might believe that, if a merger lowers the price the
merged firm pays for its inputs, consumers will necessarily benefit. The
logic seems to be that because the input purchaser is paying less, the
input purchaser's customers should expect to pay less also. But that is
not necessarily the case. Input prices can fall for two entirely different
31. See, e.g., CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 6, at 107.
32. A monopsonist's marginal factor cost equals its marginal increase in cost in purchasing an
additional unit. PERLOFF, supra note 7, at 522-23.
33. See, e.g., Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Antitrust Policy and Monopsony, 76 CORNELL L.
REv. 297, 302-03 (1991).
34. Id.
35. Given the per se illegal status of seller-side concerted action over price, it is assumed here that
no such downstream concerted action will take place.
36. See Blair & Harrison, supra note 33, at 303-07; Marius Schwartz, Economics Director of
Enforcement, Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Buyer Power Concerns and the Aetna-Prudential
Merger, Address Before the 5th Annual Health Care Antitrust Forum, Northwestern University School
of Law, at 3-5 (Oct. 20, 1999) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/
3924.pdf).
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reasons, one of which arises from a true economic efficiency that will
tend to result in lower prices for final consumers. The other, in contrast,
represents an efficiency-reducing exercise of market power that will
reduce economic welfare, lower prices for suppliers, and may well result
in higher prices charged to final consumers.
37
Nevertheless, Mr. Pate declined to explain how lower input costs may
in fact lead to higher prices for consumers. It is important to identify the
reason for reduced input costs leading to higher prices downstream, for
recognition and comprehension of it has proved elusive for some courts.
Marius Schwartz, again speaking on behalf of the Department of Justice,
provided a more complete explanation, positing that "if input price falls
because of the exercise of increased monopsony power by the merged firm,
the input quantity utilized will typically fall. This induces the firm to cut its
output of the good it sells to consumers and raise its price."3
The key to understanding how consumers may be rendered worse off,
then, is marginal cost. Monopsonists' downstream marginal costs of
production will likely go up due to a decrease in output. Why is this? It is
because the reduced quantity of input, though purchased at a diminished
per unit cost, will lead the monopsony-wielding firm to counteract the
ensuing shortfall in supply by partially substituting another input for the
monopsonized input. Importantly, however, this variable-proportions
production substitution will not be efficient.39 The result will be an elevated
overall marginal cost of production. As profit-maximizing entities sell their
goods at the point where marginal revenue equals marginal cost,4" a higher
marginal cost will lead to higher prices. Those higher prices will in turn
lead to a diminution in output in the downstream market, clearly reducing
consumer welfare. Accordingly, prohibition should follow where collusive
oligopsonists' downstream marginal costs are elevated.
However, a number of critical assumptions underlie the above
conclusion. The first is that significant market power exists in the
downstream market. Where a firm has no market power, its unilateral
decrease in output will not affect the market-clearing price. Accordingly,
there will be no consumer harm. The second is that a reduction in the
37. R. Hewitt Pate, Assistant Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Statement Before the
Senate Committee on the Judiciary Concerning Antitrust Enforcement in the Agricultural Marketplace,
at 4 (Oct. 30, 2003) (transcript available at http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/201430.pdf).
38. Schwartz, supra note 36, at 6.
39. Given the assumption of profit maximization, we can be confident of the resulting inefficiency,
for were the substitution efficient, it would already have taken place prior to the exercise of upstream
monopsony power.
40. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 6, at 91. Note that the only exception to this profit-
maximization rule lies in the oligopoly and oligopsony contexts. There, the profitability of a given price
depends on the price being charged by other firms in the market. Accordingly, price being set according
to the intersection of marginal revenue and marginal cost in this setting will not always be profit-
maximizing.
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quantity of the input sold in the upstream market will take place. Where the
input elasticity of supply is perfectly inelastic, there will be no reduction in
the quantity of input, no increase in marginal cost, and no consumer harm.
The third is that there will be no pre-existing and overriding market power
on the selling side in the upstream market. Moreover, where an upstream
supply curve can be characterized as all-or-nothing-which arises where
concerted oligopsony or monopsony power may dictate the quantity
purchased, thereby forcing suppliers off their marginal cost curves to their
average cost curves-no allocative inefficiency will take place, either
upstream or downstream.41
The circumstances in which these foregoing assumptions break down
will now be considered. Importantly, though, a showing that a business
practice is not always harmful to consumer welfare is an insufficient
ground for rejecting application of the per se standard. If the practice is
incapable of carrying concomitant benefits, then the risk of a Type I error
in applying the per se standard is reduced to zero. The worst possible
outcome is that a business practice, the effect of which is neutral, is struck
down. Crucially, though, there are circumstances in which concerted
oligopsony power may elevate consumer welfare. These circumstances are
addressed below.42
C. WHEN MARKET POWER DOES NOT EXIST DOWNSTREAM, CONSUMER
WELFARE CANNOT BE HARMED
The fact that consumer harm cannot arise absent downstream market
power is the first indication that per se treatment of concerted
oligopsonistic conduct may be inappropriate. It may be possible for a group
of firms to wield monopsonistic power upstream collectively, but to face
competition downstream. What is the consequence of their joint exercise of
purchasing power? The quantity of input purchased will decrease, as will
the cost-per-unit. The unit reduction will typically lead the oligopsonists to
have a higher downstream marginal cost of production. In setting their
first-order condition for profit-maximization, then, a lower level of output
will be produced. Critically, however, the competitive nature of the market
will result in no effect on the market-clearing price. That being so, there
will be no consumer harm.
It is interesting to observe that downstream competition will usually
imply that the input elasticity of supply in the input market will be high. In
other words, one can expect a showing of downstream competition to
correlate with a lack of monopsony power upstream, as manufacturers of
41. See generally C. Robert Taylor, Monopsony and the All-or-Nothing Supply Curve: Putting the
Squeeze on Suppliers (June 2003), http://www.aubum.edu/-taylocr/topics/market/supplycurve.pdf. See
also Part 111.0, infra.
42. See infra Part lI.E.
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the relevant input will have many prospective purchasers for their produce.
Now, in a legal environment in which it is legal for purchasers to
collude to lower the price for their inputs, it may be the case that the entire
industry, competitive as it is downstream, will form a buyer-side cartel. In
such circumstances, sellers in the input market may find themselves
"locked-in" with no other sales avenues. At that time, monopsony power
will exist and the quantity and price of the input will both likely decrease.
The law's per se prohibition of seller-side collusion would apply to prevent
downstream concerted action with respect to the ultimate market-clearing
price. Nevertheless, if the entire downstream market on the selling side
enters into an upstream buyer-side cartel, each firm's downstream marginal
cost of production will rise due to the decrease in supply of the
monopsonized input. Thus, each firm's downstream price will rise. In
short, even a competitive downstream market could experience a long-run
price increase. Strangely, the downstream market would still be regarded as
competitive if the price remained close to marginal cost, yet the higher
levels of marginal cost would result in higher prices and lower output. This
is precisely the kind of harm to which adherents of the Chicago School-
defined consumer welfare standard would object.
Accordingly, the foregoing analysis begs the following crucial
question: would a legal regime permitting collusive, oligopsonistic
behavior in cases where downstream market power is lacking inadvertently
lead to a long-run diminution in downstream competition? As described,
the danger may be that upstream, collective monopsony power may lead to
elevated downstream prices. Importantly, though, there are two reasons
why such a fear is unwarranted.
First, even though each oligopsonist's elevated marginal cost will lead
it to raise prices, there will be an incentive for each firm to decline to
participate in the upstream cartel so as to keep its marginal cost lower than
its rivals. Although a decision not to avail itself of upstream monopsony
power will have a short-run, profit-reducing effect, the oligopsonists'
ultimate ability to profitably charge a lower price downstream will enable
them to take market share off their monopsony power-wielding rivals. In a
one-shot game, every downstream seller would join the upstream cartel to
increase its payoff. In a multi-period game, however, the higher expected
return in period N + 1 onward to be enjoyed by taking market share of
rivals, discounted to present value, would likely exceed the reduced profits
in the first period. As an extension of the same point, increased prices in
the downstream market will create an avenue for rival firms to enter the
market and contract with the upstream sellers on more reasonable terms to
undercut the incumbents.
Second, such a situation would create a tremendously strong incentive
for the upstream sellers to vertically integrate into the downstream market.
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By doing so, they would be able to undercut the incumbent sellers and,
again, take market share. Although the downstream market would
ostensibly be characterized by competition, the incumbents' artificially
high marginal costs would create a source of major competitive advantage
to the vertically integrating firm. The risk of post-entry insolvency would,
therefore, be low.
Crucially, then, the foregoing economic theory predicts that the
exercise of monopsonistic pricing will be ephemeral. The transient nature
of the practice accordingly renders unlikely the prospect that monopsony
upstream will last long enough to have an appreciable effect on a
competitive downstream market.43
Combining these points, it is somewhat unlikely that a competitive
downstream industry will collectively engage in an upstream cartel for a
prolonged period. Yet to the extent that competition would nevertheless be
reduced, it is important to note that antitrust scrutiny of the upstream
oligopsonistic cartel would then be sharply increased. When competition
no longer exists downstream, or is appreciably diminished, the possibility
of consumer harm exists and the monopsony-wielding cartel would be
outlawed.
Accordingly, a showing of downstream market power should be
legally required from the consumer welfare perspective in an antitrust suit
against oligopsonist behavior.
D. MONOPSONY POWER SHOULD NOT APPRECIABLY RESTRICT OUTPUT
WHERE THE INPUT ELASTICITY OF SUPPLY IS Low
Where the input elasticity of supply in an upstream market is low, and
in a context of perfect access to information, a concerted effort by
oligopsonists to increase price will not entail a significant reduction in the
quantity of input sold. As should be clear from the foregoing economic
discussion, the reduction in output in the upstream market creates the
various objectionable consequences of monopsony. The following
discussion will explain the importance of input elasticity of supply.
In the short-run, seller lock-in may render supply perfectly inelastic at
and above the average variable cost of production." Short-term lock-in
should not be unexpected, for it is an effective sine qua non for monopsony
power to exist.4 5 In such a case, there will be no short-term reduction in
43. Supracompetitive profits caused by power on the buying side will generate entry in the long-run.
Accordingly, the effects of monopsony will likely be transitory. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 15, at
15.
44. It is profit-maximizing for a firm to continue selling in the short run, as long as price is higher
than average variable cost. See PERLOFF, supra note 7, at 236-37. In the long run, pricing below average
total cost leads to insolvency and exit from the market. Id. at 246.
45. Monopsony power is apt to exist only where the resource in question is uniquely valuable in its
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output in the upstream market. Accordingly, inefficient intra-firm
substitution in production need not take place and so downstream marginal
costs in production will not rise. The collusive oligopsonists' costs will
haven fallen with no concomitant inefficiency. Indeed, this may facilitate
lower prices downstream. The only sure short-run consequence is a wealth
transfer from sellers to buyers. While this may be inequitable, it does not
constitute consumer harm.
To appreciate how this outcome may arise, consider the following
situation. A group of input manufacturers may produce enough inputs for
the coming period. As the relevant inputs have only one use, and the cost to
convert them into other products is more than the gap between the price
offered by the monopsony cartel and the cost of selling to the cartel, all
produced inputs will be sold. Thus, there will not be any immediate
reduction in output.
Beyond the first period, supply will be more elastic. If purchasers
force the price to below average variable cost plus the requisite markup to
cover fixed cost-i.e., average total cost, which includes opportunity
cost-sellers will exit the market in the second round and there will be a
reduction in output in the upstream market. This will carry all the
consequences leading to consumer harm described above, assuming the
existence of downstream market power.
However, the oligopsonists will know this in advance and will not be
so myopic as to force its suppliers out of the upstream market.
Accordingly, oligopsonists acting in concert could be expected to set price
at a level equal to the average total cost of the sellers in that market. In
these circumstances, no output restriction will take place, for average total
cost incorporates the opportunity cost of the sellers in employing their
capital to produce the goods being purchased by the oligopsonists.
If the preceding observation were unreservedly true, the consumer
welfare standard would require that concerted instances of monopsonistic
control enjoy a per se standard of legality. Because no output-restriction
would ever happen upstream, no consumer harm could follow downstream.
Of course, and unfortunately, this is not the case.
The problem lies in the existence of information and inter-firm
efficiency asymmetries. With respect to the former, even though the
collusive monopsonists would like to set price equal to the average total
cost of the upstream sellers, it will be prohibitively difficult for them to
accurately pinpoint that relevant price. Of course, if the oligopsonists added
a premium to the price they offered to purchase at, they would likely
current use, so that even if the price is depressed by monopsony, sellers are unable to find alternative
buyers. See RICHARD A. POSNER & FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, ANTITRUST 150 (2d ed. 1981).
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succeed in keeping the price above the average total cost of their suppliers.
They are more likely, however, to estimate downward, for in resolving
ambiguities, the colluding oligopsonists will likely err on the side of lower
prices, which increase their short-run profits.
The latter issue of inter-firm efficiency asymmetry merely accentuates
the problem faced by colluding oligopsonists wishing to set price at the
average total cost of the suppliers, for it is unlikely that any two firms
operate under precisely identical cost functions. Accordingly, price
discrimination would have to be exercised, which brings a plethora of its
own difficulties.46
Thus, it can confidently be concluded that some output reduction in an
upstream market is likely to occur in the long run, despite the best efforts of
the oligopsony firms in question.
An important qualification remains, however. While a very low
elasticity of supply tends to preclude allocative efficiency-based concerns,
where price is successfully set equal to the sellers' average total cost, it
does not follow that equitable considerations are not raised, for a
monopsonist may be able to transfer much of sellers' wealth to itself. While
this will not trigger antitrust concerns on the consumer welfare ground, a
broader reading of antitrust harm may conclude otherwise.
E. THE POSSIBLE BENEFITS ASSOCIATED WITH CONCERTED MONOPSONY
POWER
The foregoing discussion in this Part demonstrates the importance of
there being actual monopsony power. Where no monopsony power
exists-where the input elasticity of supply is high-no consumer harm
can follow. Given the demonstrable danger that levels of monopsony power
will be exaggerated, 7 it is essential to recognize this point. As will be seen,
it is currently unclear whether courts applying the per se standard require
such a showing as a prerequisite. Some cases may be read as exempting
explicit cartels where sellers had alternative sales avenues,4" which is the
correct outcome from an economic perspective.
To go further, however, occasional lack of monopsony power may
result in beneficial consequences. Conceivably, concerted behavior on the
46. These not only include further information access issues, but finding and applying a mechanism
by which to prevent arbitrage between sellers. See CARLTON & PERLOFF, supra note 6, at 294.
47. See, e.g., David Waterman, Local Monopsony and Free Riders, 8 Info. Econ. & Pol'y 337, 351-
53 (1996), available at http://www.indiana.edu/-telecom/faculty/waterman/monopsony-iep.pdf.
48. See, e.g., Knevelbaard Dairies v. Kraft Foods, Inc., 232 F.3d 979, 1002 (9th Cir. 2000) (holding
that plaintiffs failed to adequately show actual monopsony power on the part of defendants); U.S.
Healthcare Inc. v. Healthsource, Inc., 986 F.2d 589, 598 (1st Cir. 1993) (rejecting monopsony-based
antitrust action against an HMO that purchased doctors' services because "doctors have too many
alternative buyers for their services").
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buyer side may enhance market outcomes and societal wealth in
circumstances of ex ante monopoly power. This observation is of
considerable importance in assessing whether to apply a per se standard to
concerted monopsony over price, for until now it has not been shown how
such concerted action may actually be beneficial, as opposed to merely
benign. It is with this observation that the possibility of Type I errors is
introduced for the first time in applying a per se approach.
In the case of pre-existing market power on the selling side, it is likely
that a concerted effort on the part of purchasers may counteract the
monopoly power and lead to a more efficient outcome. That the upstream
market may be characterized by the existence of some form of seller-based
market power ex ante suggests that instances of concerted oligopsonistic
conduct in such a market may shift the market-clearing price closer to the
competitive level.49
Should a buyer-side cartel be allowed to argue in defense that the
prices being charged in the market were excessive? The answer is almost
certainly not. Allowing firms to do so would not only be highly
problematic in practice,5° but would seem to contradict the well-established
principle that seller-side cartels cannot argue that prices were too low.5"
Moreover, politically sensitive situations may arise, particularly in the
employment context. For example, a group of employers, having been
accused by employees of conspiring to depress wages, would be in a
position to argue that the employees' legally granted market power in the
form of trade union membership caused prices to be too high, thereby
legitimizing their concerted conduct over price. Such a position, if legally
recognized, would be more than somewhat perverse.5
49. Interestingly, at least one court has recognized such a possibility. In Knevelbaard Dairies v.
Kraft Foods, Inc., the Ninth Circuit observed:
If defendants managed to force the price floor down lower than it otherwise would be but
that level was still above the price that would exist in a competitive market without any
price supports, the lower price floor will simply allow mutually beneficial transactions that
would not have occurred under the higher price floor. The lower price floor actually opens
the market up more to the forces of competition.
232 F.3d. at 1003.
50. It is notoriously difficult for a court to judge whether a particular market price is at, below, or
beyond the competitive level. See, e.g., Donald F. Turner, The Definition of Agreement Under the
Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REv. 655, 669 (1962) (noting
the obviousness of the fact that courts are ill-suited to act as price regulators). This difficulty is
exacerbated by the fact that any statements put forward by parties before the court will be non-credible.
51. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 220-21 (1940).
52. It is unlikely, however, that such a right on the part of employers would be recognized. The
Supreme Court has ostensibly applied a per se standard to the employment context. See Anderson v.
Shipowners' Ass'n, 272 U.S. 359, 365 (1926) (holding that a shipowners' cartel organized for the
purpose of suppressing wages paid to seamen violated the Sherman Act). Moreover, the Congressional
grant of qualified antitrust immunity to trade unions increases the suspicion that employers would not
be entitled to point to employee monopoly power. See infra text accompanying note 54.
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Consider the case of the seller-side cartel first. In such a situation,
buyer-power preceding the concerted conduct on the selling side of the
market may lead to the latter improving efficiency. Yet the law properly
refuses to entertain such claims. Why is this? The answer lies in the nature
of the per se standard. Even where a seller-side cartel collectively possesses
little market power, the resulting, elevated prices-short-lived as they will
be, given the context of competition-will entail, at the least, a wealth
transfer from consumers to sellers. In other words, concerted seller action is
rarely, if ever, benign from a societal perspective. Most importantly,
however, there is little or no possibility of a concomitant efficiency-gain.
As concerted seller behavior almost invariably increases prices being
charged to consumers, and pre-existing monopsony power will not
typically exist and would entail the employment of scarce judicial
resources to demonstrate, efficiency is justifiably enhanced by the per se
rule; the probability of Type I errors is low.
Now consider the buyer-side cartel. Here, strict adherence to the
consumer welfare standard renders concerted oligopsonistic behavior
somewhat different. Consumer harm is more attenuated in this context and
involves looking to more than one market. As there are numerous exigent
circumstances, which do not arise with respect to seller-side cartels, that
may render the practice benign from consumers' perspective, the law
should be more amenable to expanding the level of judicial scrutiny.
Nevertheless, the distinction does not seem sufficiently satisfactory to
warrant the startling disparity between buyer- and seller-side cartels where
the former may be allowed to argue that the prevailing prices were unfair
but the latter may not.
Fortunately, there is an effective solution. Rather than argue that
prices were unfairly high, buyer-side cartels ought to be allowed to argue
that they did not, in fact, collectively possess or acquire monopsony power.
Where the market is monopolized ex ante, an ensuing concerted exercise of
buyer-side power will likely counteract that monopoly power, but will be
unlikely to rise to monopsony levels. The courts have much experience in
assessing business entities' market power, so requiring them to do so in the
current context does not appear unreasonable. In short, there can be few
easier ways for defendants to show that they do not possess market power
than by pointing to monopoly power on the other side of the market. This
is a far more workable defense than asking courts to become de facto price
regulators by assessing whether defense arguments of high market prices
were correct.
Would the employer in the above example be capable of defending a
monopsony claim by pointing to the unionized nature of the seller-side of
the market? The answer is probably not. First, Congress has expressly
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exempted trade unions from antitrust scrutiny." In essence, the legislative
branch has recognized that some level of market power on the selling side
of labor markets is desirable.54 It is not at all clear that purchasers in the
labor market should be entitled to use a legislative grant of market power to
facilitate harm against the group Congress sought to protect." Second, it
will often be the case that employers will possess significant market power,
notwithstanding the presence of trade unions. This will be particularly true
in markets where there are few employers and a large number of
prospective employees with relatively homogenous skills. In such heavily
oligopolized markets, trade unions may actually shift the wage rate closer
to the competitive level. In fact, such appears to motivate the legislative
exemption of trade unions from antitrust liability: the Clayton Act was
enacted, in part, to counteract the perceived exercise of monopsony power
against employees, particularly through the use of injunctions.56
Nevertheless, were a market to exist in which there are many
interested purchasers for a relatively small number of sellers, who are not
unionized, and a considerable disparity in market power between the
former and latter, the buyers may be entitled to point to the extent of ex
ante monopoly power on the selling-side of the market. As expounded
upon in Part III.D, infra, the courts may allow such a defense under the
current law. It appears, though it is not certain, that the courts require some
level of monopsony power in order for a violation of the Sherman Act to be
found. It is certainly conceivable, however, that the employment context
may provide a distinct setting where to recognize such a defense would
53. Sections 6 and 20 of the Clayton Act have this effect. 15 U.S.C. §§ 17 and 52 (2000).
Importantly, however, concerted action between unions and third parties are not exempted. See Mine
Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 662 (1965).
54. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (2000) ("The inequality of bargaining power
between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by
depressing wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the
stabilization of competitive wage rates and working conditions within and between industries."); see
also Meat Cutters v. Jewel Tea Co., 381 U.S. 676, 723 (1965), superseded by statute, H.R. Rep. No. 72-
669, at 10 (1932), as recognized in Bhd. of Maint. of Way Employees v. Guilford Transp. Indus., Inc.,
803 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1986).
55. This point is far from academic, having been discussed by the Supreme Court. See Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 518 U.S. 231, 255 (1996) ("In light of the accommodation that has been struck between
antitrust and labor law policy, it would be most ironic to extend an exemption crafted to protect
collective action by employees to protect employers acting jointly to deny employees the opportunity to
negotiate their salaries individually in a competitive market.") (Stevens, J. dissenting). Importantly,
however, the Brown decision did not discuss the likely ramifications of employers colluding to depress
wages where employees possessed vastly disproportionate market power. Justice Stevens did mention,
however, that unique market characteristics may justify application of the rule of reason standard. Id. at
252.
56. See, e.g., Allen Bradley Co. v. Local Union No. 3, 325 U.S. 797, 802-03 (1945). See also text
accompanying note 54, supra.
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subvert legislative intent to confer a level of market power on trade unions.
Of course, if purchasers are allowed to point to pre-existing monopoly
power as a defense to a monopsony claim, a disparity still exists; market
power is not required for a seller-side cartel to be found illegal, but is
required in monopsony cases. 7 Nevertheless, the distinction may be
justified on the grounds that monopsony cases arise rarely and, when they
do, there is less likelihood of consumer harm. On this ground, seller-side
cartels that lack appreciable degrees of market power will quickly lose
sales, but on the sales that do transpire there will be an unwarranted wealth
transfer from consumer to seller. Buyer-side cartels that lack market power
will not entail a wealth transfer from consumers, however, for no output
restriction will take place upstream and so there will be no inefficient intra-
firm input substitution in production, no higher marginal cost, and hence no
price increase for the consumers downstream.
This foregoing discussion simply reinforces that a qualified per se
standard of legality ought to be applied58 in which market power on both
the buying-side upstream and seller-side downstream must be
demonstrated. 9
F. THE SOCIAL LOSSES NOT ENCAPSULATED BY THE CONSUMER WELFARE
STANDARD
The preceding analysis demonstrates that there are many situations in
which consumer welfare considerations will not be triggered by concerted
oligopsonistic behavior. Importantly, however, consumer-based effects are
not the only possible grounds upon which to judge business practices.
Another, likely superior, foundational norm may involve looking to
the process of competition itself. Price theory predicts that heightened
levels of competition will lead to elevated levels of output, in addition to
allocative and productive efficiency. From an economic perspective, then,
any business practice that blunts the process of competition and causes a
resulting instance of output restriction in a relevant market is objectionable.
Where is the consumer in this analysis? Typically, the concept of such
welfare is inversely correlated with the magnitude of deadweight loss in a
market-as competition increases, so will output and thus deadweight loss
will diminish. Accordingly, the output-expanding process of competition
will lead to heightened levels of consumer welfare, other things being
equal. Thus, the concept of consumer welfare harm may serve as a proxy
57. Not only is this distinction justified on economic grounds, it appears to be the current law. See
infra Part III.D.
58. This may be thought of as being akin to the modified per se rules covering tying arrangements,
in which market power in the tying market and an appreciable impact on the tied market must be
demonstrated. See Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 461-62 (1992).
59. See infra Part IV.
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for output restriction. Recognizing this clarifies the point that consumer
harm should not be a prerequisite to antitrust harm where competition and
output are reduced.
Adopting the aforementioned baseline of competitive harm-one that
may be characterized as a "market distortion-based approach"-we will be
far quicker to find harm in the context of monopsony pricing. The fact that
consumers may not reside in an upstream input manufacturing market does
not change the fact that it is a relevant market for antitrust purposes.
Monopsony power, as we have seen, will usually curtail output. Sellers in
that market will likely have the prices they can charge reduced to sub-
optimal levels, leading them to produce less. As their products create value
for society, net societal wealth will be reduced. As mentioned before, the
reduced quantity of input will lead the oligopsonists or monopsonist to
engage in inefficient substitution in production, entailing further wasteful
expenditures. Even if no downstream market power exists, and consumers
are not made worse off, deadweight loss follows from the monopsonistic
control of price upstream.
In a very real sense, then, the concerted exercise of monopsony power
reduces the level of competition in a relevant market. From the market
distortion perspective, therefore, such concerted action should be deemed
illegal. Moreover, the standards required of per se illegal status are met,
except in the readily identifiable instance where the buyer-side cartel lacks
monopsony power over price. As seen in Part III.E, supra, societal welfare
may in fact be furthered by allowing concerted action by purchasers in a
context of pre-existing power on the selling side. Since circumstances in
which no monopsony power exists can be readily and effectively identified,
they can be efficiently excluded from the per se rule. In sum, the risk of
Type I errors is significantly reduced by applying per se illegality subject to
the preliminary requirement of demonstrable monopsony power.
G. ECONOMIC CONCLUSIONS
Taking the strict variant of the consumer standard first, the key is to
formulate a straightforward set of rules that will effectively and accurately
dichotomize consumer welfare-reducing instances of buyer-side collusion
and their benign counterparts. The key to this lies in the nature of
downstream and upstream competition. Accordingly, a court seeking to
implement this narrowly defined antitrust philosophy would find a buyer-
side cartel objectionable only where the cartel succeeded in obtaining an
appreciable level of monopsony power and where the cartel members
possessed market power downstream. Long-run evidence of a lack of
sellers exiting the market would imply that the market-clearing price is at
least equal to the long-run average cost of the sellers and, thus, no output
restriction is taking place. Such an insight may be used to support the
argument that monopsony power is not being exercised in the market-or
HASTINGS BUSINESS LAW JOURNAL
that if it is, it is benign.
A broader inquiry of competitive harm, however, would concern itself
with business practices leading to reduced levels of industrial output and
allocative efficiency, for such consequences diminish overall societal
wealth. From this perspective, a court need only look to whether the
constituents of a buyer-side agreement collectively possess power over the
price at which the relevant input clears. If they do, then the arrangement
can be safely condemned, irrespective of downstream consumer harm.
To understand how these approaches differ in practice, let us return to
query the hypothetical posed in the introduction. Interestingly, this simple
example effectively operates to clearly distinguish the effects of a strict
consumer welfare-devoted antitrust policy, on the one hand, and a market-
distortion-based one, on the other.
From a strict consumer-welfare perspective, the exercise of concerted
oligopsonistic power is laudable in this instance. This is a scenario in which
there is a high level of downstream competition. Accordingly, the
possibility of consumer harm is effectively precluded. The only possible
obstacle would be raised in certain labor market cases. As this is not an
employment case involving trade unions, in which legislative intent may
preclude a defense of no consumer harm, consumer-focused courts would
approve the agreement.
A broad market-distortion-based view of anticompetitive behavior,
however, would condemn the above behavior on a per se basis, even
though on these facts downstream consumer welfare will not be affected.
As the cartel has reduced the market-clearing price to sub-optimal levels, a
reduction in output will result. The agreement ought therefore to be struck
down.
The divergence ceases to exist when the facts are altered slightly so
that there is only a single seller in the market for the necessary input. Now
the situation in which the four CEOs meet in an attempt to lower input
costs is one of pre-existing market power on the seller side. By jointly
combining their purchasing power, the four companies will lower the
market-clearing price and elevate output, so long as their ensuing level of
monopsony power does not outweigh the monopoly power. So construed,
downstream prices will drop and consumer welfare will rise. Even from the
market-distortion perspective, the buyer-side agreement should be legal
insofar as the resulting power does not rise to monopsony levels.
In a very real way, this simple example highlights the divergence in
the law between jurisdictions on this topic today. Some courts have been
misled by the counterintuitive, though crucially important, insight that
artificially lowered input costs upstream may cause prices to rise
downstream. Other courts have adopted a strict variant of the consumer
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welfare standard, according to which downstream market power is a
prerequisite to illegality. These courts fail to appreciate that the foregoing
standard serves as a generally accurate proxy for measuring the kind of
harm that typically flows from artificially created market distortions. In the
monopsony setting, that proxy may not be accurate.
Interestingly, though, it is not perfectly clear whether the courts have
required actual monopsony power to exist. It is submitted that they should,
and fortunately, such appears to be the more reasonable interpretation of
the relevant jurisprudence in the field.
IV. THE COURTS' REACTION
Given the somewhat esoteric nature of the economic consequences of
monopsony, it will be of little surprise to learn that the courts have failed to
posit a consistent and coherent theory of competitive harm. The following
discussion will demonstrate that the Supreme Court's say on the subject
suggests, but does not unequivocally compel, a per se standard of illegality.
The ensuing debate in the lower courts has focused on whether
demonstrable consumer harm in downstream markets is an implied
qualification with respect to the Supreme Court's ruling. Underlying the
debate is a divergence between various courts with regard to the proper role
of antitrust law. Those courts that require a showing of downstream market
power appear to place determinative significance on the issue of consumer
harm. In contrast, the majority of courts find the concerted exercise of
monopsony power innately objectionable irrespective of the existence of
consumer injury. According to the latter perspective, market distortions and
injury to innocent sellers in monopsonized markets constitute valid and
independent grounds for illegality.
A further, and highly important, question is whether the law requires
an actual showing of monopsony power. The lower courts that have had the
opportunity to clarify this issue have not done so. It will be suggested,
however, that the more reasonable reading of the relevant case law suggests
that oligopsonists must actually achieve a level of monopsony power for
condemnation to follow.
A. THE SUPREME COURT'S INTERPRETATION
The Supreme Court last addressed the legality of collusive,
monopsonistic conduct almost sixty years ago. In a 1948 decision, the
Court held in no uncertain terms that a buyer-side conspiracy to reduce the
price paid for a necessary input violates the Sherman Act.60 There,
California sugar producers colluded to suppress the price they had to pay
60. Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235 (1948).
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for sugar beet.
The decision may fairly be interpreted as suggesting that per se
illegality attaches to concerted instances of monopsonistic pricing.61 Such is
clear from the Court's opinion, which, in relevant part, stated:
It is clear that the agreement is the sort of combination condemned by
the Act, even though the price-fixing was by purchasers, and the persons
specially injured under the treble damage claim are sellers, not customers
or consumers. . . . The statute does not confine its protection to
consumers, or to purchasers, or to competitors, or to sellers. Nor does it
immunize the outlawed acts because they are done by any of these.62
While it is reasonable to construe the judgment as requiring collusive
monopsony to be treated as per se illegal, it is important to note that the
judgment makes no explicit reference to consumer harm. However, the
Court did state that "[t]he idea that stabilization of prices paid for the only
raw material consumed in an industry has no influence toward reducing
competition in the distribution of the finished product, in an integrated
industry such as this, is impossible to accept."63 This would seem to imply
that the Supreme Court was concerned with downstream effects, at least to
some degree.
Whether downstream consequences were viewed as the determinative
issue or merely an additional ground supporting the finding of illegality is a
critical question. Perhaps consumer harm was understood to exist or,
alternatively, the Court may have found the upstream market distortion to
be objectionable in and of itself. The Court's language may make the latter
interpretation the more reasonable one. Justice Rutledge's holding made
quite clear that the Sherman Act does not exist for the sole benefit of
consumers.
This is an extraordinarily important aspect of the Mandeville
judgment, for it would seem to render the economic analysis conducted in
Part II redundant. If the antitrust laws unambiguously apply not only to
protect consumers, but also market distortions negatively affecting market
participants, then the foregoing economic investigation of when
monopsony power will harm consumers is clearly defunct.
However, it is crucial to note that this decision took place long before
the Chicago revolution of the late seventies through the eighties.
Accordingly, given the current focus on the well-being of consumers, the
U.S. Supreme Court could plausibly require a showing of consumer harm
in oligopsony cases. Accordingly, the modem question may be whether the
61. The Seventh Circuit has explicitly held so. See Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598,
601 (7th Cir. 1984).
62. Mandeville, 334 U.S. at 235-36.
63. Id. at 241.
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Court properly implied the existence of downstream consumer harm in
Mandeville.
An additional issue is whether actual monopsony power was a formal
requirement for the Court or whether any buyer-side cartel is illegal. Given
the importance of this question, it shall be considered in Part III.D, infra.
B. THE MINORITY APPROACH
Although a majority of jurisdictions to consider the question of
monopsony have interpreted Mandeville as importing a per se standard of
illegality, a number of courts have nevertheless construed concerted
monopsonistic behavior in a benign manner where there is no downstream
market power.
In Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Foundation, Inc., the U.S.
District Court for the District of Massachusetts considered a motion for
summary judgment taken by defendant purchasers accused of conspiring to
lower prices.' 4 In doing so, the court had to assess whether the plaintiff
seller had antitrust standing; that is, injury of the type the antitrust laws
were intended to prevent.65 It was held that business losses to the plaintiff
alone would not suffice. Rather, antitrust injury "occurs when the colluding
buyers possess market power on a downstream market. Only with control
of a downstream market can the monopsonist decrease output and raise
price."6 6 As there was an adequate allegation of market power, the court
found the requisite standing.
This decision is arguably inconsistent with the Supreme Court's
decision in Mandeville, though, as noted, the latter case did not refer to
consumer harm. Interestingly, the Addamax decision reflects a recognition
of the economic fact that consumer welfare cannot be diminished without
some level of corresponding downstream market power. Accordingly, the
court can be seen applying a strict variant of the consumer welfare
standard. Of course, were a more expansive definition of consumer harm to
be employed, the District of Massachusetts' requirement of downstream
power would be erroneous for legitimizing certain monopsonistic practices
which, although not adversely affecting the market-clearing price
downstream, do reduce output in upstream markets, disrupt the normal
operation of market forces, and harm upstream sellers.
The U.S. District Court for the Western District of New York has
expressed a similar opinion. In Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v.
64. Addamax Corp. v. Open Software Found., Inc., 888 F. Supp. 274, 276 (D. Mass. 1995).
65. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477, 489 (1977).
66. Addamax, 888 F. Supp. at 280.
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Rochester Gas & Electric Corp., the court held: "The problem with this
type of monopsony power, then, is that ultimately it can injure consumers
by forcing up the price of the end product. Where the risk of that happening
is slight or nonexistent, however, monopsony power per se does not create
an antitrust concern."
67
Again, the court can be seen as employing a narrow version of the
consumer welfare standard. As explained below, however, other courts to
consider the issue have construed the spectrum of competitive harms on a
broader basis.
C. THE MAJORITY APPROACH
The weight of authority clearly counsels for per se prohibition of
concerted oligopsonistic control over price.68 Intriguingly, then, the
majority position appears to reflect a market-distortion perspective,
according to which consumer harm is not the ultimately relevant factor. As
monopsony power reduces output in a relevant product market, albeit one
in which consumers do not reside, it is properly condemned according to
this view.
Representatively, the Tenth Circuit recently held in Telecor
Communications, Inc. v. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. that the
"unmistakable import of the case law" compels the conclusion that
"suppliers . . . are protected by antitrust laws even when the anti-
competitive activity does not harm end-users."69 The Tenth Circuit clearly
viewed the Addamax and Kamine cases as outliers that were out of touch
with the weight of authority.70
The D.C. Circuit has espoused a similar view, holding that "market
inefficiencies created by anticompetitive restraints on input markets can be
as destructive of a free market economy (and therefore ultimately
damaging to consumers) as restraints on output markets.",71 In addition, the
Seventh Circuit has construed concerted monopsony pricing as being
67. Kamine/Besicorp Allegany L.P. v. Rochester Gas & Elec. Corp., 908 F. Supp. 1194, 1203
(W.D.N.Y. 1995).
68. See, e.g., Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 810 (1946) (holding that antitrust law
can apply to input, as well as output, markets); Mandeville Island Farms v. Am. Crystal Sugar Co., 334
U.S. 219, 243 (1948) (strongly implying a per se standard of illegality); Vogel v. Am. Soc'y of
Appraisers, 744 F.2d 598, 601 (7th Cir. 1984) (applying a per se standard); Reazin v. Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Kan., Inc., 899 F.2d 951, 962 (10th Cir.1990) (rejecting a defense argument that lack of
harm to consumers precludes the existence of antitrust injury); United States v. Syufy Enters., 903 F.2d
659, 663 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[l~t is theoretically possible to have a middleman who is a monopolist
upstream but not downstream .... ").
69. Telecor Commc'ns, Inc. v. Sw. Bell Tel. Co., 305 F.3d 1124, 1133-36 (10th Cir. 2002).
70. Id. at 1133-36.
71. Brown v. Pro Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1061 (D.C. Cir. 1995).
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equivalent to seller-side cartels and accordingly illegal per se.
Clearly, the majority of courts has rejected the strict consumer welfare
approach and has instead adopted the position that output restriction within
a relevant market is sufficiently objectionable to warrant prohibition. The
remaining question is whether the majority standard is likely to permeate
into, and be accepted by, the minority jurisdictions. It is the hope and
expectation of this Article that it will.
D. Is AN ACTUAL SHOWING OF MONOPSONY POWER REQUIRED?
The cases in which the courts have condemned buyer-side cartels have
all involved the existence of actual monopsony power. This begs the
necessary question of whether a showing of such power is a sine qua non
for violation of the antitrust laws.
The Supreme Court in Mandeville placed great emphasis on the fact
that monopsony power did, in fact, exist.73 Given this focus, it is an open
question as to whether the Court would have deemed the arrangement
illegal had it involved only a small percentage of the buyer-side of the
market. Consideration of other case law furthers the inference that buyer
cartels are not illegal until the buyers collectively possess market power.
The Tenth Circuit in Telecor construed the Mandeville decision as
turning, in part, on the effectiveness of "the sugar refiners' monopsonistic
price-fixing scheme" due to the fact that "growers could not easily find
other buyers or profitably switch to other crops when refiners conspired to
fix the price of sugar beets. 74 In addition, the D.C. Circuit opined that
"restraints on input markets arise only in the unusual circumstance of an
effective monopsony."75 Where no monopsony power follows concerted
buyer behavior, no restraint in the input can result. Accordingly, then, the
D.C. Circuit might not find such an outcome objectionable.
The Second Circuit's analysis in Todd v. Exxon Corp. strongly
suggested that a showing of market power is required.76 In conducting an
examination of the buyer side of the market, the court noted the importance
of the fact that "a greater availability of substitute buyers" will result in "a
smaller quantum of market power on the part of the buyers in question."77
Such a discussion would be essentially redundant but for the significance a
72. See Khan v. State Oil Co., 93 F.3d 1358, 1361 (7th Cir. 1996), vacated, 522 U.S. 3 (1997);
Vogel, 744 F.2d at 601.
73. Mandeville Island, 334 U.S. at 223-24 (emphasizing that all purchasers in the relevant market
were privy to the seller-side cartel and that the sugar beet producers were effectively locked-in, which
of course facilitated monopsony power).
74. Telecor, 305 F.3d at 1133-36.
75. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1061 (emphasis added).
76. Todd v. Exxon Corp., 275 F.3d 191, 202 (2d Cir. 2001).
77. Id.
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lack of market power would have on the buyer-side cartel claim.
Relevantly, no such analysis would be undertaken in a § 1 action under the
Sherman Act against seller-side cartels-the only issue would be whether
the constituent firms entered into a price agreement.78 Accordingly, the
courts' treatment of monopsony cases is noticeably different from the
market power perspective.
Economic theory predicts that buyer-side collusion failing to yield
market power should not be held illegal. In addition, it is important to note
on a pragmatic level that applying a pure per se rule-one not requiring
market power-would yield absurd results. For instance, if a person agrees
with his friends not to purchase from a local shop until it lowered its prices,
would that be illegal? The question does not survive its asking. For all
these reasons, monopsony power should be a prerequisite to a § 1 action in
this sphere. Encouragingly, the major judicial decisions in the area appear
to mirror the foregoing economic theory and pragmatism. A definitive
judicial determination as to this question would, nonetheless, be most
valuable.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has attempted to unravel the somewhat arcane economic
process by which concerted monopsony power is capable of leading to
consumer harm. It has been shown that some form of both monopsony
power upstream and monopoly power downstream is required for consumer
welfare to be diminished. Yet, only the former requirement is necessary for
output restriction to take place in an economically relevant product market.
The distinction creates an inherent tension that can only be reconciled by
the adoption of a clear competitive standard.
The resulting question raised by this Article is whether the consumer
welfare standard should be interpreted in the strict manner advocated by
some. It has been shown that there are many instances in which the
exercise of upstream monopsony power will not be harmful to consumers.
Accordingly, adherence to the consumer welfare model does not lead easily
to per se condemnation. Yet, something seems perverse about an antitrust
rule-even one applied on a qualified basis-that would allow firms to
explicitly collude, significantly alter the price at which the relevant market
clears, and harm the sellers residing therein.
Perhaps the better way to approach antitrust questions is not through
the lens of consumer welfare, narrowly defined, but rather from the
perspective of market distortions. According to the latter paradigm,
concerted deformation of market processes may be objectionable in and of
78. See, e.g., United States v. Trenton Potteries Co., 273 U.S. 392, 398 (1927) (holding that
minimum, horizontal price-fixing is illegal per se).
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itself. Such a standard would inarguably comport with the Supreme Court's
antitrust jurisprudence, which has spoken not so much of consumer
welfare, but of protecting the process of competition. It is unquestionably
the case that the Court has viewed the vigorous process of competition
itself as the most sacrosanct concern of the antitrust laws.79 The debate now
is whether "the process of competition" that is to be protected involves a
consumer welfare prescription, an aggregate welfare norm, or some other
guiding principle. The more modem focus on consumer welfare, introduced
by the Chicago School, resonates well with the goal of protecting the
competitive process, for the latter will generally promote the former.
Nevertheless, it remains uncertain as to whether the Court would define the
consumer welfare imperative in so narrow a way as to render legally
innocuous explicit instances of competition being suppressed by colluding
purchasers.
From the market-distortion perspective, then, concerted monopsony
power clearly eliminates competition on the buyer side of the market, and
absent some countervailing consideration, such as the ex ante existence of
seller-side monopoly power in the same market, clearly qualifies for the per
se standard. In addition to some courts, the Department of Justice has
ostensibly adhered to a market-distortion standard in analyzing cases of
monopsony. 80 Particularly pertinent on this ground-and illuminative on
the question of the future definition of consumer welfare-are the recent
comments of Marius Schwartz, speaking for the U.S. Justice Department:
Should antitrust be concerned with monopsony mergers which reduce
welfare but do not harm consumers? An objection I've heard is that
"antitrust protects consumers not competitors." In my view, however,
this phrase should not be read literally as saying that only consumers
matter. It is a metaphor for saying that antitrust is concerned not with
individual competitors but with the competitive process. So if a merger
increases market power and thereby harms the firm's trading partners-
customers or suppliers-by more than it benefits the firm, antitrust
concern is warranted. Insisting on consumer harm is overly narrow.81
Nevertheless, the consumer welfare standard has much to commend it.
Artificially created market distortions almost invariably harm consumers
and the latter constitutes a very close proxy for the former. Focus on the
consumer enables courts to effectively dissect the cases before them and to
79. See, e.g., Gordon v. N.Y. Stock Exch., Inc., 422 U.S. 659, 689 (1975) (holding that "the sole aim
of antitrust legislation is to protect competition" without mentioning consumer welfare); id. at 692 (the
"antitrust laws are designed to safeguard a strong public interest in free and open competition .... ")
(Douglas, J., concurring); Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 359 (1963) ("[T]he antitrust laws
serve, among other things, to protect competitive freedom .... "); Mandeville Island Farms v. Am.
Crystal Sugar Co., 334 U.S. 219, 235-36 (1948) (explicitly holding that the Sherman Act protects more
than consumers).
80. See, e.g., Pate, supra note 37.
81. Schwarz, supra note 36.
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avoid mistaking harm to individual competitors-a consequence of both
competition-enhancing and competition-reducing business practices-for
harm to the competitive process. Given the frequency with which the
Supreme Court has made this mistake,82 this benefit of the consumer
standard is not to be underestimated.
If, however, the consumer welfare standard is to be applied in its
literal form, the logical consequences of its application must be accepted,
even in draconian circumstances. Accordingly, instances of firms explicitly
entering into buyer-side cartels and curtailing output in an upstream market
must be regarded as benign where downstream market power is lacking.
Thus, if the courts are to hold to the standard they proclaim, a modified per
se approach-akin to that now employed in the product-tying context-
must be utilized.
Until the Supreme Court has occasion to revisit the question of
concerted monopsony power, or until the minority jurisdictions accept the
sound economics behind the majority approach, a tension will continue to
persist within this area of law. The unresolved question will be whether
courts should be compelled to highlight demonstrable consumer harm in
monopsony cases or to simply condemn such cases where market
distortions arise. Both the Supreme Court historically,83 and the U.S.
Department of Justice recently,84 have spoken of the antitrust laws being
applied for more than consumers alone. If such is to be the case for the
future, the ostensibly exclusive focus on consumer welfare in other
contexts must be reconsidered for overall coherence in the field of antitrust
law. The key to this is explicit recognition of the fact that the concept of
consumer welfare serves as a mere proxy for efficient, output-maximizing
market outcomes.
82. See, e.g., BORK, supra note 4, at 427 (discussing the erroneous manner in which the Supreme
Court has construed various business practices as malign, even when they in fact furthered the
competitive process and elevated consumer welfare); see also POSNER, supra note 29, at 20 (same).
83. Mandeville Island, 334 U.S. at 219.
84. See Pate, supra note 37.
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